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Political Bubbles is very enjoyable, insightful, and challenging, writes Declan Jordan. It addresses a
remarkably under-analysed aspect of the financial crisis and the interface generally between politics and economics.
Some of the political failures that came to the fore for the financial crises are just as likely to hinder political
approaches to important problems, including poverty, inequality, and climate change. The analysis and ideas within
the book are too important to be considered in a narrow context.
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There are two well-worn clichés arising from the current global economic and financial
crisis. The first is that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. The
second (which is attributed to Rahm Emanuel in an epigraph in Chapter 9 of this book)
is that a good crisis should not be wasted. Those who wish to wish to avoid the trap of
the former and respond to the call for reform in the latter should read this wonderful
book by Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. The book sets out a
very convincing case that the political system must assume a significant proportion of
the blame for the financial crisis that has brought the global economic system to the
brink. They support their case with evidence and a forensic dissection of the political
influences that were – and to a large extent remain – at play in the US political system.
The book should be read by anyone who wishes to understand the genesis of the economic and financial crisis and
who wishes to know how the political fault lines that threaten a repeat of the crisis can be meaningfully addressed.
The book will appeal particularly to an American readership but it would be a shame if the book was overlooked
elsewhere because it has very valuable lessons for all democracies, and non-US readers will be struck by the
similarities in the political aspects of the global crisis. As an Irish academic I was frequently struck by the similarities
between the political structures and behaviours that brought Ireland and the rest of Europe to crisis.
The authors do not place all of the blame at the feet of government. Financial institutions are correctly fingered as
the primary culprits, particularly in relation to sub-prime lending, securitisation of assets in such a way as to prevent
their correct valuation, and the overly risky activity undertaken by the organisations that saw themselves as too big
to fail. However, this is not the focus of the book and it benefits from the narrower focus on the government’s role in
financial regulation and how it was derelict in its monitoring and regulatory roles.
The recently published House of Debt by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi complements this book by exploring less obvious
causes or contributors to the economic crisis. Mian and Sufi argue that policy is too heavily biased towards
protecting banks and creditors. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal shed light on why that is the case, specifically
demonstrating in Chapter 3 the power of the financial services industry exercises over the political sphere in the US.
The authors identify the “Three I’s” as explanations of the emergence of the conditions that enabled the financial
crisis in the US and the failure of the government to act to prevent the crisis in time: ideology, interests, and
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institutions. Each of these is given a separate chapter in Part I of the book in which the authors present evidence
that convincingly shows how politicians were unwilling and the broader political system was unable to do what was
necessary to avoid the crisis or deal effectively with it.
While none of the three I’s on their own could have led to the crisis or the mishandling of it, together they were a
powerful combination. Ideology is distinguished from the expectations built up during bubbles by the rigidity of the
beliefs that do not respond to new information, argument and contexts. The authors refer to the seminal example of
ideological capture during the crisis, which is Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan’s testimony to the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee in which he spoke of the shock to his ideology built over 40 years’
experience that the self-interest of organisations were the best guarantor of shareholders. While the commitment to
markets underpinning right-wing ideology is more obvious as the crisis unfolded, the authors also point to the role of
the egalitarian ideology of the left in promoting some of the excesses in the mortgage market, especially in sub-
prime lending. The discussion on ideological underpinnings for the crisis are complemented by a very well
presented and researched range of statistics tracking ideological differences in US politics and the extent of
polarisation in the House and Senate and its relationship to voting on financial issues.
The role of special interests, and specifically how the financial services industry became a powerful interest group, is
discussed in Chapter 3. Through three mechanisms, mobilising constituencies, campaign contributions and
providing information through lobbying, the financial services industry successfully ensured less regulation and less
oversight of its increasingly risky activities. The book reports average contributions to House incumbents from the
financial industry in the 2007-8 election cycle. This shows that contributions were almost equal between Democrats
and Republicans but that those members on the Financial Services Committee received approximately double the
amount received by average non-members.
The authors point to two critical elements of the institutions of the political process that worked against avoidance
and/or swift resolution of the crisis. The first is the division of powers in the US, which is “so fragmented, separated
and checked that policy change requires extraordinary consensus and mobilisation” (page 91). While noting the
benefits of the checks and balances laid out in the constitution, the recent crisis has shown up the clear weaknesses
of the system when rapid policy change is required. The second element is the short election cycle in the US, which
ensures that parties are never far from the next election. This short cycle emphasises short term fixes, create delay
and inactivity ever second year and transform policy disagreements into more bitter campaign battles. The authors
also point to the debilitating effects of cloture in the Senate and they demonstrate how filibuster rules can create
gridlock.
The first part of the book considers how politics enabled the crisis; the second part considers how politics responded
to historical financial crises and the crisis that ‘popped’ in 2008. In this part, the authors excel at presenting clear and
convincing data to support their argument that short-term incentives of political actors, ideological rigidity and the
pressure from powerful interest groups delayed effective action in 2008 and in historical crises. The final chapter in
Part 2 is an interesting consideration of the reaction of political players and the electorate to the crisis. The authors
refer to cultural and anti-statist populism to explain why, even after the crisis in 2008, there was not a concerted and
overwhelming call for regulation of the financial markets.
The final part of the book turns towards potential solutions to the inability of government to appropriately regulate the
financial services industry to prevent and/or address future crises. The solutions proposed are largely
underwhelming in their ambition. The more practical solutions address the financial market directly, including
increased regulatory and prosecutorial capacity, limit the size and autonomy of financial firms, drastically simply
regulatory rules and reform compensation practices. However, if one accepts the arguments of the authors
throughout the book, one would be less than convinced that the current political system can deliver these reforms.
There are also very important and worthwhile political reforms suggested by the authors, such as reform of the
cloture rule, less self-interested driven policy and a new political force through an alternative third-party. The authors
point to previous experiences of the latter two and it would be interesting to explore what is preventing their
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emergence at this time. The authors pull back from recommending a change in the cloture rule in the current
polarised environment, which gos to the hard of why the rule is actually in place.
This book is very enjoyable, insightful and challenging. It addresses a remarkably under-analysed aspect of the
financial crisis and the interface generally between politics and economics. Some of the political failures that came
to the fore for the financial crises are just as likely to hinder political approaches to important problems, including
poverty, inequality and climate change. The analysis and ideas within the book are too important to be considered in
a narrow context.
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